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Abstract
We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooper-
ative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games
that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied
by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [12].
We show that the core of such games is norm compact and we provide some represen-
tation results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our results.
1 Introduction
In their studies of values of exchange economies with a continuum of players, Aumann and
Shapley [2] introduced (non-atomic) market games, a class of transferable utility (TU) coop-
erative games that includes those arising from exchange economies. These games have been
extensively studied in value theory (see, e.g., [27, Sect. 12]) and our purpose in this paper is
to provide a thorough study of their cores, a fundamental solution concept for TU games.
Hart [16] showed that under weak conditions the cores of market games arising from
exchange economies are finite dimensional subsets of non-atomic measures. Our main result,
Theorem 6, complements his result by showing that, in general, cores of market games are
norm compact subsets of non-atomic measures. This implies that cores of these games have
a very strong structure, and that the finite dimensional case is actually the most important
form that they can take. The result of Hart [16] can thus be viewed as “typical” for the
cores of market games. Theorem 6 actually holds for the larger class of games that admit a
na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, a class studied by Einy,
Moreno, and Shitovitz [12].
We then provide, in Theorem 9, a classification of market games based on the properties
of their na-extensions and on generalizations of the linear productions games of Owen [28]
∗We thank Achille Basile for helpful discussion. The financial support of the Ministero dell’Istruzione,
dell’Universita` e della Ricerca is gratefully acknowledged.
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and Billera and Raanan [4]. Proposition 10 shows that the cores of these generalized linear
production games admit a convenient representation, and in this way we extend earlier results
of Billera and Raanan [4], Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [12], and Marinacci and Montrucchio
[20]. Finally, in Theorem 13 we provide a full characterization of exact market games.
Some of our results can be interpreted in the Multiple Priors model axiomatized by Gilboa
and Schmeidler [14]. In particular, we will show how norm compact sets of priors consisting
of non-atomic probability measures have some useful properties that do not hold for general
sets of priors. For example, Multiple Priors preferences featuring such sets of priors are never
Choquet Expected Utility preferences, unless they are Subjective Expected Utility. In other
words, these Multiple Priors preferences have only a “trivial” overlap with Schmeidler [30]’s
Choquet Expected Utility ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and preliminaries, Sec-
tion 3 reviews some essentially known representation results, while Section 4 establishes the
paper’s main results, whose proofs are relegated to the Appendix. Section 5 contains some
examples. Finally, Section 6 provides the Multiple Priors interpretation of our results, and
the reader only interested in this issue can move directly to this section, after having a look
at Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 for some notation and terminology.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
2.1 Games and Set Functions
Let Ω be the set of players, Σ the σ-algebra of admissible coalitions, and X a Banach space.
A function ν : Σ→ X such that ν (∅) = 0 is called a set function. A set function ν is:1
• bounded if supA∈Σ ‖ν (A)‖ <∞;
• additive (a vector charge) if ν (A ∪B) = ν (A) + ν (B) for all pairwise disjoint A and
B;
• continuous if limn→∞ ν (An) = limn→∞ (ν (Ω)− ν (Acn)) = 0 whenever An ↓ ∅;
• countably additive (a vector measure) if ν (⋃∞i=1Ai) = ∑∞i=1 ν (Ai) for all countable
collections of pairwise disjoint sets {Ai}∞i=1.
The variation of a set function ν : Ω→ X is the function |ν| : Ω→ [0,∞] defined by
|ν| (A) = sup
∑
i
‖ν (Ai)− ν (Ai−1)‖ , ∀A ∈ Σ
where the supremum is taken over all finite chains A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ ... ⊆ An = A. A set function
is of bounded variation if |ν| (Ω) <∞. If the map ν 7→ |ν| (Ω) defines the variation norm on
1In the sequel subsets of Ω are understood to be in Σ even where not stated explicitly and they are referred
to both as sets and as coalitions.
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the vector space bv (Σ, X) all X-valued set functions of bounded variation (see [2, Sect. 4]).
The variation norm is complete.
Given a set function ν : Σ → X, a coalition N is ν-null, or simply null, if ν (A ∪N) =
ν (A) for all A in Σ. An atom of ν is a non-null coalition A such that for every B ⊆ A, either
B or A \B is null. If ν has no atoms, ν is called non-atomic (see, [2, p. 14] and [21, p. 55]).
We call (transferable utility) game a real valued set function, and measure (charge, resp.)
a real valued vector measure (vector charge, resp.). A game ν is:
• positive if ν (A) ≥ 0 for all A;
• superadditive if ν (A ∪B) ≥ ν (A) + ν (B) for all pairwise disjoint A and B;
• convex if ν (A ∪B) + ν (A ∩B) ≥ ν (A) + ν (B) for all A and B;
The set ba (Σ) of all charges of bounded variation, as well as its subsets ca (Σ) of all
measures and na (Σ) of all non-atomic measures, is a closed subspace of bv (Σ) = bv (Σ,R).
As well known, ba (Σ) is (isometrically isomorphic to) the norm dual of the space B (Σ)
of all bounded and measurable functions (endowed with the supnorm), the duality being
〈g, µ〉 = ∫ gdµ for all g in B (Σ) and µ in ba (Σ). We will sometimes write µ (g) instead
of
∫
gdµ. For all α ∈ R, the closed and convex subset of ba (Σ) consisting of all measures
taking value α at the grand coalition Ω is denoted by baα (Σ); caα (Σ) and naα (Σ) are defined
analogously.
2.2 Exact Games
The core of a game ν : Σ→ R is the set
core(ν) = {µ ∈ ba (Σ) : µ (Ω) = ν (Ω) and µ(A) ≥ ν(A) for all A ∈ Σ}.
The core is a weak* compact subset of ba (Σ). Games having non-empty cores are called
balanced.
A balanced game ν is exact if
ν (A) = min
µ∈core(ν)
µ (A) , ∀A ∈ Σ.
An exact game ν is naturally extended to B (Σ) by the function
νe (g) = min
µ∈core(ν)
µ (g) , ∀g ∈ B (Σ) . (1)
Clearly, a game is exact if and only if it is the lower envelope
νK (A) = inf
φ∈K
φ (A) , ∀A ∈ Σ (2)
of a non-empty bounded subset K of baα (Σ).2 In this case, the weak* closed and convex hull
co∗ (K) of K is contained in core (νK). Notice that in general the inclusion is strict, namely,
co∗ (K) 6= core (νK) (see Examples 6, 7, and 8 of Section 5).
The next proposition is basically proved in [21, p. 54-58].
2When we consider subsets of a normed space, by bounded we mean norm bounded.
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Proposition 1 Let K be a non-empty bounded subset of baα (Σ). The game νK is continuous
if and only if K is a relatively weak compact subset of caα (Σ). In this case, νK is non-atomic
if and only if K ⊆ naα (Σ).
2.3 Market and Pre-Market Games
An ideal coalition is an element ofB (Σ) taking values in [0, 1], and the set of all ideal coalitions
is denoted by B1 (Σ). The set B1 (Σ) can be endowed with the na-topology due to Aumann
and Shapley [2], which is the coarsest topology that makes continuous all the functionals
g 7→ µ (g) with µ ∈ na (Σ).3 By the Lyapunov Theorem, the characteristic functions are
na-dense in B1 (Σ). Therefore, any game ν, when viewed as a function 1A 7→ ν (A) over
the characteristic functions, has at most one na-continuous extension to B1 (Σ). Following
Aumann and Shapley [2], we denote this extension by ν∗.
We say that a game ν is a (non-atomic) market game if it is superadditive and admits a
positively homogeneous na-continuous extension ν∗ (see, e.g., Mertens [24] for a similar defi-
nition). This name is justified by the fact that, as it will be seen momentarily in Proposition
5, under suitable conditions exchange economies with a continuum of agents can be modelled
as market games. For this reason, market games play an important role in value theory.4
Aumann and Shapley [2, Prop. 27.1] show that the superadditivity of a market game ν is
inherited by its extension ν∗, so that ν∗ is superlinear when ν is a market game. In particular,
this implies that a game ν is a market game if and only if it has a superlinear na-continuous
extension ν∗. We will also consider games having a concave na-continuous extension ν∗, and
we will call them pre-market games.
In the sequel we will make use of the following result, due to [22, Prop. 4], which shows
that convex and pre-market games have trivial overlapping.5
Lemma 2 A bounded convex game is a pre-market game if and only if it is a non-atomic
measure.
3 Representation of Market Games
Before moving to our main results, we devote this section to state some useful representation
results for market and pre-market games that show how they can be viewed as generalized
vector measure games. This was first observed by Milchtaich [25], and our next result slightly
refines his main finding on this issue (see [25, Lm. 2]).
Specifically, consider a vector measure µ : Σ → X, where X is a Banach space. For all
3Of course, any subset of B (Σ) can be endowed with the na-topology.
4When (Ω,Σ) is a standard Borel space, the class of games having na-continuous extensions coincides with
Aumann and Shapley’s class pNA′, while market games are the subclass they denote by H ′ (see [2, p. 273]
and [15]).
5See the discussion of Proposition 31 in the Appendix for a proof.
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f ∈ B (Σ), let ∫ fdµ be its integral ([9, p. 6]). The extended range
R (µ) =
{∫
fdµ : f ∈ B1 (Σ)
}
of µ is a weakly compact and convex subset of X ([9, p. 14]).
Proposition 3 A game ν is a pre-market game (a market game, resp.) if there exists a
non-atomic vector measure µ : Σ→ X of bounded variation with values on a suitable Banach
space X, and a weakly continuous and concave (superlinear, resp.) function ϕ : R (µ) → R,
with ϕ (0) = 0, such that
ν (A) = ϕ (µ (A)) , ∀A ∈ Σ. (3)
In this case, the na-continuous extension of ν is given by




, ∀f ∈ B1 (Σ) .
The converse is true provided (Ω,Σ) is a standard Borel space.
If X is finite dimensional, the game ϕ ◦ µ given by (3) is called a vector measure game.
This is an important class of games (see, e.g., [17]) and Proposition 3 is the announced result
that shows how pre-market games can be regarded as generalized vector measure games.
Using the representation established in Proposition 3, next we provide a differential char-
acterization of cores of pre-market games (see [12, Thm. C] and [20]).
Proposition 4 Let X be a Banach space, µ : Σ → X a non-atomic vector measure of
bounded variation, and ϕ : R (µ)→ R a weakly continuous and concave function with ϕ (0) =
0. Then,
core (ϕ ◦ µ) = {x∗ ◦ µ : x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (0) and x∗ (µ (Ω)) = ϕ (µ (Ω))} ,
provided it is not empty.
Consider now a transferable utility exchange economy, consisting of: a standard Borel
space (Ω,Σ, λ) of traders with a non-atomic probability measure λ; a commodity space Rn+; a
utility function u (·, ω) : Rn+ → R+ for each agent ω ∈ Ω and an initial allocation a : Ω→ Rn+,
which is λ-integrable.
The standard assumptions made are:
(a.1) u (·, ω) is monotone non-decreasing and u (0, ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω,
(a.2) u (·, ω) is continuous for all ω ∈ Ω,
(a.3) u (·, ·) is jointly Borel measurable,





This economy induces the game ν : Σ→ R defined by
ν (E) = sup
{∫
E
u (x (ω) , ω) dλ :
∫
E






where the sup is taken over all λ-integrable allocations x : Ω → RN+ . Under (a.3) and (a.4)
this game is well defined, with the supremum attained (see [2, Ch. 6] and [16]).
By considering the vector measure µ : Σ → L1 (λ) given by µ (A) = 1A, where 1A is
viewed as an element of L1 (λ), it easily follows from the representation of Proposition 3 that
the game (4) is a market game. This and other properties of this game are stated in the next
result. Tightness of the bound in point (iii) is the only novelty, the rest is due to Hart [16]
(see Proposition 3.4, Theorem C, and Corollary 2.16 of his paper, respectively).
Proposition 5 Let (a.1)-(a.5) hold and ν be defined by (4). Then,
(i) ν is a market game;
(ii) core (ν) is generically a singleton, i.e., this is true for all total initial allocations a =∫
adλ outside a set of Lebesgue measure zero in Rn++;
(iii) core (ν) ⊆ na (Σ), dim core (ν) ≤ n, and this bound is tight.
4 Main Results
4.1 Cores
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 6 The core of a pre-market game is a norm compact set of non-atomic measures.
In other words, cores of pre-market and, a fortiori, of market games are norm compact
subsets of na (Σ). Notice that while market games are necessarily balanced, pre-market games
are not. Example 1 in Section 5 shows that the concavity of the na-continuous extension is
crucial for this result.
As a corollary of Theorem 6 we obtain a known result on the games in pNA, reported here
for sake of completeness.6 In reading it recall that market games in pNA arise, for instance,
in the exchange economy described in Section 3 under smoothness assumptions on the utility
function u (·, ω) (see [2, Thm. J]).
Corollary 7 If (Ω,Σ) is a standard Borel space, then the core of any balanced pre-market
game in pNA is a singleton and it coincides with the Aumann-Shapley value.
The next sum rule is a consequence of Theorem 6 and it shows that cores of pre-market
games are stable under summation.
6pNA is the closure in the variation norm of the linear space of games that is generated by all powers of
non-atomic probability measures.
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Corollary 8 If ν1 and ν2 are pre-market games, then
core (ν1 + ν2) = core (ν1) + core (ν2) . (5)
Note that (5) implies that core (ν1 + ν2) = ∅ if core (νi) = ∅ for some i. The sum rule
(5) does not hold in general, and bounded convex games are the only other class of games for
which it is known to hold (see [7] and [20, Cor. 9]). However, by Lemma 2 bounded convex
games and pre-market games are essentially disjoint classes of games, and so Corollary 8
provides a new important class of games for which the sum rule holds.
4.2 Linear Production Games
Using the extension properties of ν∗ we can provide a classification of market games. The
simplest class of market games is given by the linear production games of Owen [28] and
Billera and Raanan [4]. They are games of the form ϕ◦µ, where µ : Σ→ Rn is a non-atomic
vector measure and ϕ : Rn → R is given by ϕ (x) = mint=1,...,T at · x, with each at ∈ Rn.
Marinacci and Montrucchio [20] and [22] have generalized this notion by considering games
of the form
ν (A) = min
µ∈Γ
µ (A) , (6)
where Γ is a finite dimensional compact subset of na (Σ). These games are called generalized
linear production games, and linear production games are the special case corresponding to
a finite set Γ.
Motivated by Theorem 6, here we further generalize these notions by considering
ν (A) = min
µ∈Γ
µ (A)
for any norm compact Γ ⊆ na (Σ). We call such a game an abstract linear production game.
We can now state the announced classification of market games based on the extension
properties of ν∗.
Theorem 9 The following properties are equivalent for a game ν:
(i) ν is an abstract (generalized, resp.) linear production game,
(ii) ν is a market game such that its na-extension ν∗ admits a further superlinear extension
to the unit ball of B (Σ) (to the entire B (Σ), resp.) that is na-lower semicontinuous at
0.
In other words, abstract linear production games are the market games whose na-extension
can be extended from B1 (Σ) to the unit ball of B (Σ), while generalized linear production
games are the market games whose na-extension can be further extended to the entire space
B (Σ).
In view of Theorem 9, generalized and abstract linear production games are natural
subclasses of market games. Interestingly, their cores admit a neat representation.
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Proposition 10 If ν (A) = minµ∈Γ µ (A) is an abstract linear production game, then
core (ν) = co {µ ∈ Γ : µ (Ω) = ν (Ω)} . (7)
Proposition 10 extends to abstract linear production games the results of Billera and
Raanan [4] and Marinacci and Montrucchio [20] on linear production games and generalized
linear production games, respectively.
Along with Lemma 2, Theorem 9 implies that abstract production games are not convex,
unless they are additive.
Corollary 11 An abstract production game ν (A) = minµ∈Γ µ (A) is convex if and only if ν
is additive, that is, if and only if Γ is the singleton consisting of ν itself.
Corollary 11 shows, inter alia, that neither the core nor the set of the extreme points
of the core of a non-additive and bounded convex game ν can be a compact (e.g., finite)
subset of na (Σ). In fact, denote by Γ either one of these two sets; if Γ is a compact subset of
na (Σ), then ν (·) = minµ∈Γ µ (·) is an abstract linear production game, something impossible
by Corollary 11.
We conclude this subsection by presenting a condition under which a market game is an
abstract linear production game. This condition is based on the vector measure representation
provided by Proposition 3. Recall that a Banach space X has the Radon-Nikodym property
(RNP) if, given any measure space (Ω,Σ) and any vector measure µ : Σ → X of bounded
variation, there is a Bochner-integrable function f : Ω → X such that µ(A) = ∫A fd |µ| for
each A ∈ Σ (see, e.g., [5, p. 16]). For example, reflexive Banach spaces and separable dual
spaces have the RNP (see [9, Sect. III]).
Here we say that a vector measure µ : Σ → X of bounded variation, defined on a
measurable space (Ω,Σ), has the RNP if there is a Bochner-integrable function f : Ω → X
such that µ(A) =
∫
A fd |µ| for each A ∈ Σ. Clearly, all vector measures of bounded variation
with values in X have the RNP if and only if X itself has the RNP.
Proposition 12 Let X be a Banach space, µ : Σ → X a non-atomic vector measure of
bounded variation, and ϕ : X → R a superlinear norm continuous function. If µ has the
RNP, then
ν (A) = ϕ (µ (A)) , ∀A ∈ Σ, (8)
is an abstract linear production game.
For example, Proposition 12 implies that vector measure games generated by Lipschitz
functions are market games if and only if they are abstract linear production games.7 In fact,
Rn has the RNP and it is easy to check that any superlinear Lipschitz function defined on a
7Specific games of the form (8), closely related to the so-called “newsvendor games,” are studied in [26].
Example 2 in Section 5 shows that the Lipschizianity assumption cannot be dispensed with.
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convex subset of Rn admits a continuous superlinear extension to the whole space. On the
other hand, the vector measure µ : Σ→ L1 (λ) given by µ (A) = 1A ∈ L1 (λ), which we used
for the exchange economy market game (4), does not have the RNP property (see, e.g., [5,
p. 15]). Hence, Proposition 12 cannot be used to determine when this market game is an
abstract linear production game.
4.3 Exact Market Games
By Lemma 2, market games are never convex, unless they are additive. Next we show that,
instead, there are plenty of examples of non trivial exact market games, so that exactness
is for market games a much more relevant notion than convexity. In particular, we show
that exact market games are a special case of abstract linear production games, and we fully
characterize them and their cores. Observe that the lower probabilities considered in Section
6 are games of this type.
Theorem 13 The following conditions are equivalent for a game ν:
(i) ν is an exact market game;
(ii) ν is superadditive, and it admits an na-continuous extension ν∗ to B1 (Σ) such that
ν∗ (αg + (1− α)β1Ω) = αν∗ (g) + (1− α)βν∗ (1Ω) (9)
for all α, β ∈ [0, 1] and all g ∈ B1 (Σ);
(iii) ν is exact and νe is na-continuous on B1 (Σ);
(iv) ν is exact, continuous, non-atomic, and its core is norm compact;
(v) ν is the lower envelope of some norm relatively compact subset K of naα (Σ);
(vi) ν is a uniform limit of exact linear production games.
In this case, for any K such that (v) holds and for any sequence νn of exact linear
production games that uniformly converges to ν, we have:
co (K) = co∗ (K) = core (ν) = lim
n
core (νn) , (10)
where the limit is taken in the Hausdorff metric.
The following stronger version of Theorem 6 for the exact case is an immediate but
noteworthy consequence of Theorem 13.
Corollary 14 An exact game is a market game if and only if its core is a norm compact set
of non-atomic measures.
By Marinacci and Montrucchio [22], the core is also the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern
stable set of an exact market game.
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5 Examples
In this section we illustrate our results by means of some examples.
Example 1 Consider the bounded convex game ν (A) = λ2 (A), where λ is the Lebesgue




Then its core is a weak compact subset of non-atomic probability measures (see Lemma 23
in Appendix). Since ν is non-additive, its core cannot be norm compact (see also Example
5). N
Example 2 Not all market games are abstract linear production games. Consider for exam-
ple the vector measure game ν = ϕ (λ, µ), where ϕ (x, y) =
√
xy for all (x, y) ∈ R2+ and λ, µ
are two non atomic probability measures on a standard Borel space. The function ϕ is not
Lipschitz and the game ν is a market game in pNA. Its extension ν∗ cannot be extended as
a superlinear function to the unit ball of B (Σ). Thus ν is not an abstract linear production
game. Notice that, however, this game can be represented as the minimum over a family of
non-atomic measures. In fact,√
λ (A)µ (A) = min
{
aλ (A) + bµ (A) : (a, b) ∈ R2+, ab ≥ 1
}
, ∀A ∈ Σ.
The set
{
aλ+ bµ : (a, b) ∈ R2+, ab ≥ 1
}
is not norm compact. N
Example 3 Let ϕ (x, y) = − (x+ y+)+ for all (x, y) ∈ R2. The measure game ν = ϕ (λ, µ),
with λ, µ ∈ na (Σ), admits a natural extension to B (Σ). Hence, ν is a linear production
game. It is actually a glove market game in that it is easy to see that it has the representation
ν = min {0,−λ,−λ− µ}. N
Example 4 We provide a simple example of an abstract linear production game. Let B be
the Borel σ-algebra of the unit interval I, and let λ be the Lebesgue measure. Denote by pin
the uniform partition of I with cardinality n, and by Bn the finite σ-algebra generated by
pin. Fix an element f ∈ L1 (λ) and define in L1 (λ) the sequence:







By the classic Martingale Convergence Theorem (see, e.g., [9, p. 67]), fn → f in the L1 norm.
Denoting N∗ = N∪ {∞}, consider the collection {µn}n∈N∗ of non-atomic measures such that
dµn/dλ = fn and dµ∞/dλ = f. The game ν (A) = minn∈N∗ µn (A) is clearly an abstract linear
production game. If, in addition, f is not Bn-measurable for any n, this game is not a linear
production game. By Theorem 13, ν is an exact market game and core (ν) = co {µn : n ∈ N∗}.
A slight modification of this example delivers a non-exact abstract linear production game.
It suffices to define ν (A) = minn∈N∗ αnµn (A), where αn is a scalar sequence approaching 1.
N
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Example 5 Let νΓ (A) = minµ∈Γ µ (A), where the set Γ ⊆ naα (Σ) is weakly compact but not
norm compact. By Proposition 1, ν is an exact, continuous and non-atomic game. However,
in view of Corollary 14 ν is not a market game. Note that Γ ⊆ core (ν) and the inclusion
may be strict. N
By Theorem 13, any norm compact and convex subset K of na (Σ) such that µ1 (Ω) =
µ2 (Ω) for all µ1, µ2 ∈ K is the core of an exact market game. The next examples show that
this is not true for compact and convex sets not contained in na (Σ). More generally, these
examples show that (10) may fail altogether if the non-atomicity assumption is removed.
Example 6 Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} and Σ = 2Ω. Set
K = {µ ∈ ba (Σ) : µ is a probability measure and µ (ω1) ≤ µ (ω2)} .
The probability measure µ such that µ (ω1) = µ (ω3) = 1/2 belongs to core (νK), but it does
not belong to co (K)(= co (K) = co∗ (K)). N
Example 7 Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} and Σ = 2Ω. SetK = {µ, φ}, where µ and φ are probability
measures such that µ (ω1) = µ (ω2) = 1/2 and φ (ω3) = 1, respectively. We have:
core (νK) = {(ξ1, ξ2, ξ3) ∈ [0, 1/2]× [0, 1/2]× [0, 1] : ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3 = 1} ,
where (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3) is the measure taking value ξi on ωi. Hence, core (νK) is larger than co (K)
(= co (K) = co∗ (K)). Since νK is convex, this example, based on [19] and [31], shows that
(10) fails even for sets of measures generating convex games. N
Example 8 Let Ω = [0, 1] and Σ is its Borel σ-algebra. Set K = {δ0, λ}, where δ0 is the
Dirac measure concentrated at 0 and λ is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. Then,
νK (A) =
{
λ (A) if 0 ∈ A,
0 if 0 /∈ A,
is a continuous and convex game. A probability measure µ belongs to core (νK) if and only







δ0 + fdλ : 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 λ-a.e.
}
,
where fdλ is the measure taking value
∫
A fdλ on A. Clearly, core (νK) is not finite dimen-
sional and it is therefore much larger than the finite dimensional set co (K) (= co (K) =
co∗ (K)). N
6 Multiple Priors Interpretation
Some of our results can be interpreted in the Multiple Priors (MP) model axiomatized by
Gilboa and Schmeidler [14]. Recall that in the MP model beliefs are represented by a set C
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of priors, and the non-singleton nature of this set reflects the limited information on which
decision makers base the quantification of their beliefs.
Formally, priors are probability charges and payoff prospects are elements ofB (Σ). Gilboa
and Schmeidler [14] give necessary and sufficient conditions on a preference relation % on
B (Σ) that guarantee the existence of a weak* compact set C of priors such that
f % g ⇔ min
p∈C
p (f) ≥ min
p∈C
p (g) . (11)
In the recent finance literature this model has been quite successful and the functional
VC (f) = min
p∈C
p (f) , ∀f ∈ B (Σ)
is sometimes called coherent utility function (see Delbaen [8]). Finally, the lower probability
νC (A) = min
p∈C
p (A) , ∀A ∈ Σ
can be viewed as the willingness to bet of the decision maker (see [13]).
The next result extends [6, Thm. 2], which give necessary and sufficient conditions on
the preference % that guarantee that C is a subset of na (Σ). Here we show that a simple
technical condition on % ensures that C is a norm compact (finite dimensional, resp.) subset
of na (Σ).
Proposition 15 Let % be a MP preference with a weak* compact set of priors C. The
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) C is a norm compact (finite dimensional, resp.) subset of na (Σ);
(ii) if fd, gd are na-convergent bounded nets (na-convergent nets, resp.) in B (Σ) such that
fd % gd for all d, then limd fd % limd gd.
The first important property of this kind of MP preferences is that they are uniquely
determined by their willingness to bet:
Corollary 16 Let %1 and %2 be two MP preferences with norm compact sets of priors C1
and C2 contained in na(Σ). Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) f %1 k ⇒ f %2 k for all f ∈ B (Σ) and k ∈ R.
(ii) νC1 ≤ νC2.
In particular, %1=%2 if and only if νC1 = νC2.
Notice that point (i) amounts to say that %1 is more ambiguity averse than %2 in the
sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci [13]. Moreover, by Proposition 10 we have:
Corollary 17 If a norm compact set of priors C is contained in na (Σ), then core (νC) =
co (C) .
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As a result, it is easy to derive the core of the lower probability νC when C is a norm com-
pact set of priors consisting of non-atomic probability measures. In particular, core (νC) = C
if C itself is convex, so that convex and norm compact subsets of non-atomic probability
measures are always the cores of the lower probabilities they generate.
All these considerations are false for general sets of priors, as Examples 6, 7, and 8 show.
By Corollary 8, lower probabilities generated by norm compact subsets of na (Σ) form a
convex set, and the map ν 7→ core (ν) is affine.
Corollary 18 Let νC1 and νC2 be lower probabilities generated by norm compact sets of priors
C1 and C2 contained na (Σ). Then, for each t ∈ [0, 1], the set function tνC1 + (1− t) νC2 is
the lower probability generated by tC1 + (1− t)C2, and
core (tνC1 + (1− t) νC2) = tcore (νC1) + (1− t) core (νC2) .
Corollary 11 takes the following form in the MP context.
Corollary 19 The lower probability νC generated by a norm compact set C of priors con-
tained in na (Σ) is convex if and only if it is a non-atomic measure.
As observed after Corollary 11, this implies that if the core of a convex lower probability
consists of non-atomic measures (that is, if the lower probability is continuous and non-
atomic), then it cannot have finitely many extreme points (unless the lower probability is a
non-atomic probability measure itself).
Another important consequence of Corollaries 16 and 19 is that MP preferences featuring
sets of priors that are norm compact subsets of na (Σ) are never Choquet Expected Utility
preferences (see Schmeidler [30]), unless they are Subjective Expected Utility preferences.8
A Proofs and Related Material
A.1 Some Preliminary Lemmas on ν∗
In this section we report some essentially known results on the na-extensions that we will
need in what follows.
If λ is a positive measure, we denote by I∞ (λ) the positive unit ball of L∞ (λ), i.e.,
I∞ (λ) = {g ∈ L∞ (λ) : 0 6 g 6 1 λ− a.e.}, and by ca (Σ, λ) the λ-absolutely continuous
measures, i.e., ca (Σ, λ) = {µ ∈ ca (Σ, λ) : µ λ}. Clearly, g ∈ I∞ (λ) iff there is f ∈
B1 (Σ) such that g (ω) = f (ω) for λ-almost every ω in Ω; to be precise, I∞ (λ) is the image
of B1 (Σ) through the projection piλ that associates to each f ∈ B (Σ) the equivalence class
[f ] ∈ L∞ (λ) of all measurable functions that are λ-almost everywhere equal to f .9 The set
8In other words, coherent utility functions generated by norm compact subsets of na (Σ) are comonotonic
additive if and only if they are additive (see Schmeidler [29]).
9With a a little abuse, we will often neglect distinguishing f from [f ] .
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ca (Σ, λ) is a closed subspace of ca(Σ) and it is isometrically isomorphic to L1 (λ). We will
use repeatedly the fact that L∞ (λ) is (isometrically isomorphic to) the norm dual of L1 (λ).
Given a subset F of L∞ (λ), the relative σ
(
L∞ (λ) , L1 (λ)
)
-topology (or σ (L∞ (λ) , ca (Σ, λ)))
has as neighborhood base at f ∈ F the sets Vf (ε;µ1, ..., µn) of the form:
Vf (ε;µ1, ..., µn) = {g ∈ F : |〈g, µi〉 − 〈f, µi〉| < ε ∀i = 1, ..., n}
where each µi  λ and ε > 0. The relative σ
(
L1 (λ) , L∞ (λ)
)
-topology has as neighborhood
base at f ∈ F the sets Vf (ε; g1, ..., gn) of the form:
Vf (ε; g1, ..., gn) =
{
g ∈ F :
∣∣∣∣∫ gigdλ− ∫ gifdλ∣∣∣∣ < ε ∀i = 1, ..., n}
where each gi ∈ L∞ (λ) and ε > 0. Clearly, the σ
(
L∞ (λ) , L1 (λ)
)
-topology is a relative
weak* topology, while σ
(
L1 (λ) , L∞ (λ)
)
-topology is a relative weak topology. These relative
topologies coincide if F is bounded in L∞ (λ).
Lemma 20 The relative σ
(




L1 (λ) , L∞ (λ)
)
topologies coincide on
‖·‖∞-bounded subsets of L∞ (λ).
If λ belongs to na (Σ), then ca (Σ, λ) is the set of all λ-absolutely continuous non-atomic
measures. In this case, the topology induced on a subset G of B (Σ) by the projection piλ
on L∞ (λ) with the weak* topology is called naλ-topology. Clearly the naλ-topology is the
coarsest topology that makes continuous all the functionals g 7→ µ (g) with µ ∈ ca (Σ, λ), and
hence it is weaker than the na-topology.
The following result is essentially due to [2] and [24].
Proposition 21 Let (Ω,Σ) be a standard Borel space. The following conditions are equiva-
lent for a game ν : Σ→ R.
(i) ν admits an na-continuous extension to B1 (Σ);
(ii) ν admits an naλ-continuous extension to B1 (Σ) for some non-atomic probability mea-
sure λ;
(iii) ν admits an σ
(
L∞ (λ) , L1 (λ)
)
-continuous extension to I∞ (λ) for some non-atomic
probability measure λ;
(iv) ν belongs to the closure pNA′ in the supnorm of the linear space of games that is
generated by all powers of non-atomic probability measures.
The proof is based on the following useful result due to [24].
Lemma 22 Let (Ω,Σ) be a standard Borel space and υ : B1 (Σ) → R a na-continuous
function. Then there is a non-atomic probability measure λ such that
υ (f) = υ (g) for all f, g ∈ B1 (Σ) s.t. g = f λ− a.e. (12)
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The next result is essentially [2, Prop. 44.27].
Lemma 23 If a game ν admits an extension ν∗ to B1 (Σ) which is na-continuous at 0 and
at 1Ω, then core (ν) ⊆ na (Σ).
The functional νe : B (Σ) → R given by (1) is defined for any balanced game ν (on the
other hand, it is an extension of ν iff ν is exact).
Lemma 24 If a balanced game ν admits a na-continuous extension ν∗ to B1 (Σ), then ν∗ ≤
νe on B1 (Σ).
A.2 Norm Compactness and Support Functionals
Lemma 25 A non-empty subset K of a Banach space X is norm relatively compact iff it is
bounded and its support functional σK : X∗ → R (x∗ 7→ supx∈K 〈x, x∗〉) is continuous in the
bounded weak* topology.10
Notice that this lemma completes Theorems 6 and 7 of Hormander [18].
Proof. Let BX∗ = {x∗ ∈ X∗ : ‖x∗‖ ≤ 1} be the unit ball in X∗. Since σK is positively
homogeneous, it is continuous in the bounded weak* topology iff its restriction to BX∗ is
continuous for the relative weak* topology.
Let K be relatively norm compact. Given ε > 0, choose x1, ..., xn ∈ K such that for all
x ∈ K, there exists i such that ‖x− xi‖ ≤ ε. For all x∗ ∈ BX∗ , consider the relative weak*
neighborhood of x∗ given by
Ux∗ (x1, ..., xn; ε) = {y∗ ∈ BX∗ : |〈xj , x∗ − y∗〉| < ε ∀j = 1, ..., n} .
If y∗ ∈ Ux∗ , for all x ∈ K,
〈x, x∗ − y∗〉 − 〈xi, x∗ − y∗〉 = 〈x− xi, x∗ − y∗〉
≤ ‖x− xi‖ ‖x∗ − y∗‖ ≤ 2ε, i.e.,
〈x, x∗ − y∗〉 ≤ 〈xi, x∗ − y∗〉+ 2ε
≤ max
j=1,...,n
〈xj , x∗ − y∗〉+ 2ε ≤ 3ε.
Whence σK (x∗ − y∗) = supx∈K 〈x, x∗ − y∗〉 ≤ 3ε; analogous considerations yield σK (y∗ − x∗) ≤
3ε (just switch x∗ and y∗). By the subadditivity of the support function, we can conclude
that
|σK (x∗)− σK (y∗)| ≤ max (σK (x∗ − y∗) , σK (y∗ − x∗)) ≤ 3ε,
for all y∗ ∈ Ux∗ , and so the restriction of σK to BX∗ is continuous in the relative weak*
topology.
10See [10, Ch. V.5] or [23, Ch. 2.7] for the definition and properties of this topology.
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Conversely, assume K is bounded and σK is continuous in the bounded weak* topology.
Then, the restriction of σK to 2BX∗ is continuous in the relative weak* topology. For all
ε > 0 there exists a relative weak* neighborhood of 0 (in 2BX∗)
U0 (x1, ..., xn; δ) = {z∗ ∈ 2BX∗ : |〈xj , z∗〉| < δ ∀j = 1, ..., n}
such that σK (z∗) ≤ ε for all z∗ ∈ U0. For all x∗ ∈ BX∗ consider the relative weak* neigh-
borhood Ux∗ (x1, ..., xn; δ). For all y∗ ∈ Ux∗ we have x∗ − y∗, y∗ − x∗ ∈ U0. Therefore,





|〈x, x∗ − y∗〉| ≤ ε.
When the elements of X are regarded as weak* continuous functions on the weak* compact
set BX∗ , what we proved amounts to the fact that: For all ε > 0 and all x∗ ∈ BX∗ , there exists
a neighborhood Ux∗ of x∗ such that supx∈K supy∗∈Ux∗ |〈x, x∗〉 − 〈x, y∗〉| ≤ ε. That is, K is
equicontinuous. Being bounded (supx∗∈BX∗ |〈x, x∗〉| = ‖x‖ ≤ supy∈K ‖y‖ for all x ∈ K) and
equicontinuous, K is relatively compact by the Ascoli-Arzela` Theorem in the space C (BX∗)
of all weak* continuous functions on BX∗ endowed with the supnorm. Notice that
dX (x, y) = ‖x− y‖ = max
x∗∈BX∗
|〈x, x∗〉 − 〈y, x∗〉| = dC(BX∗ ) (〈x, ·〉 , 〈y, ·〉) .
Since every sequence in K admits a Cauchy subsequence in C (BX∗), it admits a Cauchy
subsequence inX. We conclude thatK is norm relatively compact inX (sinceX is complete).

For future reference we state the following immediate reformulation of Lemma 25.
Lemma 26 A subset K of a Banach space X is norm relatively compact iff it is bounded
and the functional x∗ 7→ infx∈K 〈x, x∗〉 is continuous on BX∗ in the relative weak* topology.
We close with a result on superdifferentials.
Lemma 27 Let X be a Banach space and ϕ : X → R∪{−∞} a concave function. If x¯ ∈ X
is such that ϕ (αx¯) = αϕ (x¯) for all α ∈ [0, 1], then
∂ϕ (αx¯) = {x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (0) : x∗ (x¯) = ϕ (x¯)} = {x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (x¯) : x∗ (x¯) = ϕ (x¯)}
for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Let α ∈ (0, 1) and x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (αx¯). By definition,
ϕ (y)− x∗ (y) ≤ ϕ (αx¯)− x∗ (αx¯) = α [ϕ (x¯)− x∗ (x¯)] (13)
for all y ∈ X. Setting y = βx¯ with β ∈ (0, 1) \ {α}, we get
(β − α) [ϕ (x¯)− x∗ (x¯)] ≤ 0
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whence ϕ (x¯) = x∗ (x¯). Hence, getting back to (13), we conclude that ϕ (y) − x∗ (y) ≤ 0 =
ϕ (x¯)− x∗ (x¯). This implies both x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (0) and x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (x¯). That is
∂ϕ (αx¯) ⊆ {x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (0) : x∗ (x¯) = ϕ (x¯)} ∩ {x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (x¯) : x∗ (x¯) = ϕ (x¯)} .
Conversely:
• if x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (0) and x∗ (x¯) = ϕ (x¯), then for all y ∈ X
ϕ (y)− x∗ (y) ≤ 0 = ϕ (x¯)− x∗ (x¯) = ϕ (αx¯)− x∗ (αx¯) ;
• if x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (x¯) and x∗ (x¯) = ϕ (x¯), then for all y ∈ X
ϕ (y)− x∗ (y) ≤ ϕ (x¯)− x∗ (x¯) = 0 = ϕ (αx¯)− x∗ (αx¯) ;
in any case x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (αx¯) . 
Lemma 28 Let X be a Banach space, K∗ a weak* compact subset of X∗, and
ϕ (x) ≡ min
x∗∈K∗
〈x, x∗〉 , ∀x ∈ X.
Then ∂ϕ (x) = cow
∗
({x∗ ∈ K∗ : 〈x, x∗〉 = ϕ (x)}) for each x ∈ X.
Proof. Clearly,
ϕ (x) = min
x∗∈cow∗ (K∗)
〈x, x∗〉 , ∀x ∈ X,
and so ∂ϕ (0) = cow
∗
(K∗) as cow∗ (K∗) is convex and weak* compact. Moreover, ∂ϕ (x) =






) ⊆ K∗ (see [23, Cor. 2.10.18]).
Arbitrarily choose x ∈ X. ∂ϕ (x) is a weak* compact and convex subset of X∗. Next
we show that ∂ϕ (x) is extremal in ∂ϕ (0). In fact, if x∗, y∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (0), t ∈ (0, 1), and tx∗ +
(1− t) y∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (x), then
〈x, x∗〉 ≥ ϕ (x) ,
〈x, y∗〉 ≥ ϕ (x) , and
t 〈x, x∗〉+ (1− t) 〈x, y∗〉 = 〈x, tx∗ + (1− t) y∗〉 = ϕ (x) ;
therefore 〈x, x∗〉 = 〈x, y∗〉 = ϕ (x) and x∗, y∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (x).
Since ∂ϕ (x) is extremal in ∂ϕ (0), if u∗ is an extreme point of ∂ϕ (x), then u∗ is an
extreme point of ∂ϕ (0) and it belongs to K∗. That is
ext (∂ϕ (x)) = ext (∂ϕ (0)) ∩ ∂ϕ (x) ⊆ K∗ ∩ ∂ϕ (x) = {x∗ ∈ K∗ : 〈x, x∗〉 = ϕ (x)} .
By the Krein-Milman Theorem
∂ϕ (x) = cow
∗
(ext (∂ϕ (x))) ⊆ cow∗ ({x∗ ∈ K∗ : 〈x, x∗〉 = ϕ (x)})
⊆ cow∗
({




x∗ ∈ cow∗ (K∗) : 〈x, x∗〉 = ϕ (x)
}
= ∂ϕ (x) .

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A.3 A Separation Result
In the sequel we will need the following separation lemma, which is of some independent
interest.
Lemma 29 Let K1 and K2 be nonempty, disjoint, norm compact, and convex subsets of
naα (Σ). Then, there exists A in Σ such that
min
φ1∈K1
φ1 (A) > max
φ2∈K2
φ2 (A) . (14)
Proof. Since Ki is weakly compact and it consists of non-atomic measures, there exists
a non-atomic probability measure λi such that φi  λi for all φi in Ki, i = 1, 2 (see [10,
Thm IV.9.2]). Therefore, all measures in K1 ∪ K2 are absolutely continuous w.r.t. λ =
2−1 (λ1 + λ2). Therefore, K1 and K2 are norm compact subsets of ca (Σ, λ) .
The Separation Hyperplane Theorem guarantees that there exist f ∈ L∞ (λ) \ {0} and
β ∈ R such that
min
φ1∈K1
φ1 (f) > β > max
φ2∈K2
φ2 (f) . (15)
Since K1,K2 ⊆ naα (Σ), w.l.o.g. we can choose f ∈ I∞ (λ). In other words, setting z (g) =
minφ1∈K1 φ1 (g)−maxφ2∈K2 φ2 (g), there exists f ∈ I∞ (λ) such that z (f) > 0. By Lemma
25, z is continuous w.r.t. the relative weak* topology on I∞ (λ). Hence, since the set
{1A}A∈Σ is dense in I∞ (λ) by the Lyapunov Theorem, we conclude that (14) holds. 




φ1 (A) ≥ inf
φ2∈K2
φ2 (A) ∀A ∈ Σ⇒ K1 ⊆ co (K2) .
Proof. Assume, by contradiction that infφ1∈K1 φ1 (A) ≥ infφ2∈K2 φ2 (A) for all A ∈ Σ and




andK2 is norm compact, by the Mazur
Compactness Theorem (see, [23, Thm 2.8.15]) co (K2) is norm compact. Direct application
Lemma 29 to co (K2) and {φ}, yields that there exists B ∈ Σ such that
inf
φ2∈K2
φ2 (B) ≥ min
µ∈co(K2)
µ (B) > φ (B) > inf
φ1∈K1
φ1 (B) ,
which is absurd. 
A.4 Proofs of the Results
Proposition 3. Let ν = ϕ ◦ µ. The variation λ = |µ| of µ belongs to na (Σ). Consider
the linear map Tµ : B (Σ) → X defined by Tµ (f) =
∫
fdµ. As µλ, we can regard Tµ as












hence, ϕ ◦ Tµ : I∞ (λ) → R is concave and weak* continuous. As λ is non-atomic and the
projection piλ : B1 (Σ)→ I∞ (λ) is (by definition) naλ-to-weak* continuous, we conclude that
ϕ ◦ Tµ ◦ piλ : B1 (Σ)→ R is the naλ-continuous extension of ν to B1 (Σ).
As to the converse, by Lemma 20 and Proposition 21 there is a non-atomic probability
measure λ such that the map 1A 7→ ν (A) admits a weakly continuous extension ν∗ to I∞ (λ).
Consider the measure µ : Σ→ L1 (λ) given by µ (A) = 1A and ϕ = ν∗. Then, ν = ϕ ◦ µ. 
Proposition 4. Denote Tµ : B (Σ)→ X the linear operator defined by
Tµ (f) =
∫
fdµ, ∀f ∈ B (Σ) .
By [9, p. 6], Tµ is a bounded linear operator. Set ϕ (x) = −∞ if x /∈ R (µ). Notice that, by
Proposition 3, (ϕ ◦ µ)∗ = (ϕ ◦ Tµ)|B1(Σ), and since 2−11Ω is in the supnorm interior of B1 (Σ)
∂ (ϕ ◦ µ)∗ (2−11Ω) = ∂ (ϕ ◦ Tµ) (2−11Ω) .
Assume core (ϕ ◦ µ) 6= ∅, then by Claim 1 in the proof of Theorem 6 (ϕ ◦ µ)∗ is positively
homogeneous along the diagonal, whence
ϕ (αµ (Ω)) = ϕ (Tµ (α1Ω)) = (ϕ ◦ µ)∗ (α1Ω)
= α (ϕ ◦ µ)∗ (1Ω) = αϕ (µ (Ω)) , ∀α ∈ [0, 1] .
Proposition 31, the chain rule for superdifferentials (see, e.g. [11, p. 119]), and Lemma 27
guarantee that
core (ϕ ◦ µ) = (ϕ ◦ µ)∗ (2−11Ω) = ∂ (ϕ ◦ Tµ) (2−11Ω)
=
{








x∗ ◦ µ : x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (2−1µ (Ω))}
= {x∗ ◦ µ : x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (0) and x∗ (µ (Ω)) = ϕ (µ (Ω))}
= {x∗ ◦ µ : x∗ ∈ ∂ϕ (µ (Ω)) and x∗ (µ (Ω)) = ϕ (µ (Ω))} .

Proposition 5. Let us prove point (iii). Assume that the game ν is generated by an economy
with n goods. Namely, u (·, ω) : Rn+ → R. Let P be the set of competitive prices. By [16,




where uΩ (a) is the value function as a function of the
total initial allocation a =
∫
adλ. Therefore, dimP ≤ n. By [16, Proposition 2.10], if x (ω) is
such that
∫
u (x (ω) , ω) dλ = ν (Ω), then the set of all competitive payoff densities is given by
u (x (ω) , ω) − p · (x (ω)− a (ω)) with p ∈ P . Such a set of L1 functions belongs to a finitely
dimensional space having dimension not greater than n. Hence dim core (ν) ≤ n.
To conclude the proof we show that the bound n is reached. Consider a continuous and
concave utility function u : Rn+ → R and assume that the u0+ = 0. Here u0+ is the recession





λ−1 [u (x+ λy)− u (x)] .
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for ω ∈ I = [0, 1] and where the players’s space is the standard Borel space
(I,B, λ). The transferable utility competitive equilibria (p, x (ω)) are characterized by the
two conditions:







A dual characterization can be formulated by the Fenchel conjugate U∗ (p, ω) defined as
U∗ (p, ω) = inf
x≥0
p · x− U (x, ω) .
More precisely, U∗ (p, ω) is the so-called concave monotone Fenchel conjugate to U . Clearly,
p ∈ ∂U (x (ω) , ω) ⇐⇒ x (ω) ∈ ∂U∗ (p, ω). On the other hand, U∗ (p, ω) = ωu∗ (p), where
u∗ (p) is the Fenchel conjugate to u (x). Therefore, ω−1x (ω) ∈ ∂u∗ (p). It is easy to deduce
that














If we pick an utility function u (x) such that at the point x = 2
∫
I a its superdifferential is of
dimension n we are done. Actually, by the Fenchel’s equality U (x (ω) , ω)+U∗ (p, ω) = p·x (ω)
we get easily that the competitive payoff densities are p · a (ω)−ωu∗ (p) with p ∈ ∂u (2 ∫I a).
By a suitable choice of the vector a (ω), the set of the payoff distribution is of dimension n.
Of course the set of the competitive payoff distributions coincides with the core. 
Theorem 6. If core (ν) = ∅ the result is trivial. Assume that core (ν) 6= ∅, and denote
by ν∗ the concave and na-continuous extension of ν to B1 (Σ). Lemma 23 guarantees that
core (ν) ⊆ na (Σ), it remains to show that core (ν) is norm compact.




, where ∂ν∗ is the superdifferential of ν∗.
The proof of this claim follows the same lines of [12, Thm. A]. First we prove that
ν∗ (α1Ω) = αν∗ (1Ω) for all α ∈ [0, 1], namely, ν∗ is positively homogeneous along the diagonal.
If µ ∈ core (ν), then µ (f) ≥ ν∗ (f) for all f ∈ B1 (Σ) (see Lemma 24). In particular,
αν (Ω) = αµ (Ω) = µ (α1Ω) ≥ ν∗ (α1Ω). Concavity of ν∗ implies ν∗ (α1Ω) ≥ αν∗ (1Ω). The










µ (f)− µ (2−11Ω) ≥ ν∗ (f)− ν∗ (2−11Ω) , ∀f ∈ B1 (Σ) , (16)




) ≤ ν∗ (2−11Ω), setting f = 1Ω we obtain µ (2−11Ω) ≥ ν∗ (2−11Ω), whence
µ (Ω) = ν (Ω) and µ (f) ≥ ν∗ (f) , ∀f ∈ B1 (Σ) ,
a fortiori, µ ∈ core (ν). 
Given the concave function ν∗ : B1 (Σ) → R, let f0 be an interior point of B1 (Σ), and
choose a positive scalar η such that ‖f − f0‖ ≤ η implies f ∈ B1 (Σ). Denote by Dν∗ (f0;h),
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with h ∈ B (Σ) the directional derivative, i.e.,
Dν∗ (f0;h) = lim
t→0+




ν∗ (f0 + th)− ν∗ (f0)
t
.
Since ν∗ is supnorm continuous, we have (see [3, Prop. 2.3]) that ∂ν∗ (f0) is a non-empty,
convex, and weak* compact subset of ba (Σ). Moreover,
Dν∗ (f0;h) = min
φ∈∂ν∗(f0)
φ (h) , ∀h ∈ B (Σ) . (17)
Claim 2. If ∂ν∗ (f0) ⊆ na (Σ), the function Dν∗ (f0; ·) is continuous on the unit ball BB(Σ)
in the na-topology.
In view of (17), Dν∗ (f0; ·) is na-upper semicontinuous on BB(Σ), provided that ∂ν∗ (f0) ⊆
na (Σ). Consequently, it suffices to check that the function Dν∗ (f0; ·) is na-lower semicon-
tinuous on BB(Σ). This is obtained with a technique inspired by Hart [15].






≥ Dν∗ (f0;h0)− ε/2 (18)
(the scalar η has been defined in before to guarantee that f ∈ B1 (Σ) if ‖f − f0‖ ≤ η, hence





As ν∗ is na-continuous on B1 (Σ), there exist a na-neighborhood
Uf0+th0 (µ1, ..., µn; δ) =
{
f ∈ B1 (Σ) : max
j=1,..,n
∣∣µj (f − (f0 + th0))∣∣ < δ} (19)
of f0 + th0 in B1 (Σ) such that∣∣ν∗ (f)− ν∗ (f0 + th0)∣∣ < εt/2, ∀f ∈ Uf0+th0 (µ1, ..., µn; δ) .
Consider now the following na-neighborhood of h0 in BB(Σ):
Uh0
(




h ∈ BB(Σ) : max
j=1,..,n
|µj (h− h0)| < δ/t
}
.




∣∣µj (f0 + th− (f0 + th0))∣∣ = t max
j=1,..,n
|µj (h− h0)| < δ.
Hence, h ∈ Uh0 implies





























− ε/2 ≥ Dν∗ (f0;h0)− ε
for all h ∈ Uh0 . This means that Dν∗ (f0; ·) is na-lower semicontinuous at h0. Since h0 was
chosen arbitrarily, Dν∗ (f0; ·) is na-lower semicontinuous on BB(Σ). 
Claim 3. If Γ is a weak* compact subset of ba (Σ) and % : B (Σ)→ R, defined by
% (f) = min
µ∈Γ
µ (f) , ∀f ∈ B (Σ) ,
is na-continuous on the unit ball BB(Σ) of B (Σ), then Γ is a norm compact subset of na (Σ).
Clearly % is na-continuous on every ball tBB(Σ) with t > 0. For all µ ∈ Γ, µ : B1 (Σ)→ R
is continuous in the na-topology, Lemma 23 implies µ ∈ core (µ) ⊆ na (Σ). Then Γ ⊆ na (Σ)
is weak* compact in ba (Σ), hence it is weak compact [21, p. 53], a fortiori, there exists a
non-atomic probability measure λ ∈ na (Σ) such that Γ ⊆ ca (Σ, λ) (see [10, Thm. IV.9.2]).
As a consequence, setting
ρ (f) = min
µ∈Γ
µ (f) , ∀f ∈ L∞ (λ)
defines a function ρ : L∞ (λ)→ R. Next we show that under the identification of L∞ (λ) with
the norm dual of ca (Σ, λ), the functional ρ is continuous on BL∞(λ) in the relative weak*
topology σ (L∞ (λ) , ca (Σ, λ)), that is Γ (being weak compact and - by Lemma 26 - norm
relatively compact) is norm compact.
Notice that % (f) = ρ (f) for all f ∈ B (Σ). Let f ′ ∈ BL∞(λ) and ε > 0. Choose f ∈ BB(Σ)
such that f ′ = f λ-a.e. and let
Uf (µ1, ..., µn; δ) =
{
g ∈ BB(Σ) : |µi (g)− µi (f)| < δ ∀i = 1, ..., n
}
be a na-neighborhood of f such that % (Uf ) ⊆ (% (f)− ε, % (f) + ε). W.l.o.g., suppose each
µi is a probability measure.
Let µi = µai +µ
s
i be the Lebesgue decomposition of each µi, with µ
a
i  λ and µsi ⊥ λ. Set
Vf =
{
h ∈ BB(Σ) : |µai (h)− µai (f)| <
δ
2
and |µsi (h)− µsi (f)| <
δ
2
∀i = 1, ..., n
}
.
Clearly, Vf ⊆ Uf and so % (Vf ) ⊆ (% (f)− ε, % (f) + ε).
Consider the weak* neighborhood of f ′
Wf ′ =
{
g′ ∈ BL∞(λ) :
∣∣µai (g′)− µai (f ′)∣∣ < δ2 ∀i = 1, ..., n
}
.
For each g′ ∈ Wf ′ , let g ∈ BB(Σ) such that g′ = g λ-a.e.. Choose and E ∈ Σ be such that
λ (E) = 0 and µsi (E
c) = 0 for each i = 1, ..., n.11 Set h = f1E+g1Ec . Then h = g = g′ λ-a.e.
and ρ (g′) = ρ (h) = % (h). Moreover, for all i = 1, ..., n
|µai (h)− µai (f)| =
∣∣µai (g′)− µai (f ′)∣∣ < δ2 ,




i ) = 0 (µ
s





|µsi (h)− µsi (f)| = |µsi (f1E) + µsi (g1Ec)− µsi (f1E)− µsi (f1Ec)| = 0,










)− ε, ρ (f ′)+ ε) .
This proves that ρ is continuous on BL∞(λ) in the relative weak* topology. 
Claim 3, when applied to the function f0 = 2−11Ω, delivers the norm compactness of
core (ν). 
Inspection of the above proof (Claims 1 and 2) delivers the following:
Proposition 31 If a game ν admits a concave and na-continuous extension ν∗ to B1 (Σ)




is continuous on the unit ball BB(Σ) in the
na-topology, and




= ∂ν∗ (t1Ω; ·) , ∀t ∈ (0, 1) .
In particular, if ν is exact, the uniqueness of the na-continuous extension to B1 (Σ) implies
that ν∗ = νe|B1(Σ) and ν
∗ is positively homogeneous; therefore ν is a market game.
In turn this implies that a bounded convex (hence exact) pre-market game is a market
game and [22, Prop. 4] is equivalent to Lemma 2.
Corollary 7. By Proposition 31, core (ν) = ∂ν∗ (t1Ω) for all t ∈ (0, 1) , where ∂ν∗ is the
superdifferential of ν∗. By [2, Prop. 24.1], for almost every t ∈ (0, 1) the na-extension ν∗ is
Frechet differentiable at t1Ω, provided ν ∈ pNA. Hence, core (ν) is a singleton and ∂ν∗ (t1Ω)





∂ν∗ (t1Ω) (S) dt = µ (S)
where µ ∈ core (ν). Accordingly, ϕν = µ ∈ core (ν) . 
Corollary 8. By Claim 1 of the proof of Theorem 6, if νi is balanced then ν∗i is positively




= ∂ν∗i (t1Ω) for all t ∈ (0, 1).
Analogously, if ν∗i (t1Ω) = tν
∗
i (1Ω) for some t ∈ (0, 1), then ∅ 6= ∂ν∗i (t1Ω) = core (νi).




> 2−1ν1 (Ω). This implies
(ν1 + ν2)
∗ (2−11Ω) = (ν∗1 + ν∗2) (2−11Ω) = ν∗1 (2−11Ω)+ ν∗2 (2−11Ω) > 2−1 (ν1 + ν2) (Ω) ,
and the game ν1+ ν2 has empty core. Suppose now that core (νi) 6= ∅ for i = 1, 2. It follows
that:
core (ν1 + ν2) = ∂ (ν1 + ν2)









= core (ν1) + core (ν2) ,
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where we are using the sum rule for superdifferentials (see, e.g., [3, Ch. 3, Thm. 2.6]). 
Theorem 9. (i) ⇒ (ii). Assume there exists a norm compact (and finite dimensional, resp.)
subset Γ of na (Σ) such that ν (A) = minµ∈Γ µ (A) for all A ∈ Σ. There exists a non-atomic
probability measure λ ∈ na (Σ) such that Γ ⊆ ca (Σ, λ) (see [10, Thm. IV.9.2]). Lemma 26
guarantees that the functional
νˆ : L∞ (λ) → R
f 7→ minµ∈Γ µ (f)
is continuous in the relative weak* topology of BL∞(λ), a fortiori, the “restriction” of νˆ to
the unit ball of B (Σ) is σ
(
BB(Σ), ca (Σ, λ)
)
-continuous and na-continuous. If, moreover, Γ
is finite dimensional, [18, Thm. 6] guarantees that νˆ is continuous on (the entire) L∞ (λ) in
the weak* topology.
(ii) ⇒ (i). Assume that a market game ν admits an extension ν∗ to BB(Σ) which is
superlinear and na-lower semicontinuous at 0. ν∗ can be extended (by) positive homogeneity
to a superlinear function on B (Σ), which we still denote by ν∗. A standard argument
guarantees that ν∗ is na-continuous on every bounded subset of B (Σ). A fortiori, ν∗ is
supnorm continuous on B (Σ) and
ν∗ (f) = min
µ∈Γ
µ (f) , ∀f ∈ B (Σ) (20)
where Γ is a weak* compact and convex subset of ba (Σ). Claim 3 of the proof of Theorem 6
shows that Γ is a norm compact subset of na (Σ). A similar argument, building on [18, Thm.
6] rather than Lemma 26, shows that if ν∗ is na-lower semicontinuous at 0, as a function on
B (Σ) rather than on BB(Σ), then Γ is finite dimensional. 
Proposition 10. If ν (A) = minµ∈Γ µ (A), with Γ a norm compact subset of na (Σ), then,
as observed in the proof of Theorem 9,
ν∗ (f) = min
µ∈Γ
µ (f) , ∀f ∈ B1 (Σ) .
Consider the extension of ν∗ to B (Σ) defined by
ν∗∗ (f) = min
µ∈Γ
µ (f) , ∀f ∈ B (Σ) .
Since Γ is weak* compact in ba (Σ), by Lemma 28,
∂ν∗∗ (f0) = cow
∗ {µ ∈ Γ : µ (f0) = ν∗∗ (f0)} , ∀f0 ∈ B (Σ) .
Finally,










µ ∈ Γ : µ (2−11Ω) = ν∗∗ (2−11Ω)}
= cow
∗ {µ ∈ Γ : µ (Ω) = ν (Ω)} = co {µ ∈ Γ : µ (Ω) = ν (Ω)} ,
where the last equality holds since Mazur Compactness Theorem guarantees norm compact-
ness of the set co {µ ∈ Γ : µ (Ω) = ν (Ω)}. 
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Proposition 12. W.l.o.g. µ 6= 0. Let K∗ = ∂ϕ (0). K∗ is a weak* compact subset of X∗,
ϕ (x) = minx∗∈K∗ 〈x, x∗〉 for all x ∈ X, and, a fortiori,
ν (A) = min
x∗∈K∗
〈µ (A) , x∗〉 = min
x∗∈K∗
x∗ (µ (A)) , ∀A ∈ Σ.
It suffices to prove that the set M = {x∗ ◦ µ : x∗ ∈ K∗} is a norm compact set of non-atomic
measures. Let λ be the variation of µ. Since µ has the RNP, there is a Bochner integrable
(w.r.t. λ) function f : Ω→ X such that µ (E) = ∫E fdλ, for all E ∈ Σ.
For all x∗ ∈ X∗, x∗ ◦ f : Ω→ R is integrable (w.r.t. λ) and∫
E





= x∗ (µ (E)) , ∀E ∈ Σ.
See [5, Thm. 1.1.8]. This implies that x∗ ◦ µ ∈ ca (Σ, λ) ⊆ na (Σ) and its Radon-Nikodym
derivative is x∗ ◦ f . Let {x∗α ◦ µ} with x∗α ∈ K∗ be a net in M . Since K∗ is weak* compact,
x∗α admits a weak* convergent subnet y∗β → y∗ ∈ K∗. In order to show that the subnet{
y∗β ◦ µ
}
of {x∗α ◦ µ} converges to y∗ ◦ µ in variation norm, we show that y∗β ◦ f converges
to y∗ ◦ f in L1 (λ). Since f is Bochner integrable, there is a sequence fn : Ω → X of simple
measurable functions such that limn
∫ ‖f − fn‖ dλ = 0.
Let ε > 0. Denote by L the diameter of K∗, there exists n0 such that
∫ ‖f − fn0‖ dλ ≤
ε/ (2L). Then∫ ∣∣y∗β ◦ f − y∗ ◦ f ∣∣ dλ = ∫ ∣∣〈f, y∗β − y∗〉∣∣ dλ ≤ ∫ ∣∣〈f − fn0 , y∗β − y∗〉∣∣ dλ+ ∫ ∣∣〈fn0 , y∗β − y∗〉∣∣ dλ
≤ L
∫
‖f − fn0‖ dλ+
∫ ∣∣〈fn0 , y∗β − y∗〉∣∣ dλ ≤ ε/2 + ∫ ∣∣〈fn0 , y∗β − y∗〉∣∣ dλ.
Let fn0 =
∑m























∣∣〈xi, y∗β − y∗〉∣∣ dλ.
Take β0 such that
∣∣∣〈xi, y∗β − y∗〉∣∣∣ ≤ ε/ (2λ (Ω)) for all i = 1, ...,m and β  β0, to obtain∫ ∣∣y∗β ◦ f − y∗ ◦ f ∣∣ dλ ≤ ε/2 + ∫ m∑
i=1
1Ai
∣∣〈xi, y∗β − y∗〉∣∣ dλ ≤ ε,
as wanted. We conclude that any net in M admits a norm convergent subnet (with limit in
M), and M is norm compact. 
Proof of Theorem 13. We first show that (i) ⇒ (ii) ⇒ (iii) ⇒ (iv) ⇒ (v) ⇒ (i) and the
first part of (10).
(i) ⇒ (ii). Being a market game, ν admits a concave and na-continuous extension ν∗ to
B1 (Σ), exactness guarantees core (ν) 6= ∅. Proposition 31 yields that νe is continuous on
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the unit ball BB(Σ) in the na-topology. A fortiori νe is continuous on B1 (Σ), and exactness
guarantees that νe|B1(Σ) is an extension of ν to B1 (Σ). It follows that νe|B1(Σ) = ν
∗ and (9)
holds.
(ii) ⇒ (iii). As ν is superadditive, by [2, Prop. 27.1] ν∗ is superadditive. While setting
β = 0 in (9) guarantees positive homogeneity. A routine exercise shows that ν∗ admits an
extension ν∗∗ to the entire space B (Σ) which is superlinear and such that ν∗∗ (g + β1Ω) =
ν∗∗ (g)+βν (Ω) for all g ∈ B (Σ) and all β ∈ R. Next we show that ν∗∗ is supnorm continuous.
In fact, if gn → g in the supnorm, there exist α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ R such that αgn+β1Ω, αg+
β1Ω ∈ B1 (Σ) and αgn+β1Ω → αg+β1Ω in the supnorm. Therefore µ (αgn + β)→ µ (αg + β)
for all µ ∈ na (Σ). Since ν∗ is na-continuous on B1 (Σ), then ν∗ (αgn + β)→ ν∗ (αg + β) and
αν∗∗ (gn) + β = ν∗ (αgn + β)→ ν∗ (αg + β) = αν∗∗ (g) + β.
Therefore,
ν∗∗ (g) = min
µ∈∂ν∗∗(0)
µ (g) , ∀g ∈ B (Σ) , (21)
where ∂ν∗∗ (0) = {µ ∈ ba (Σ) : µ (g) ≥ ν∗∗ (g) for all g ∈ B (Σ)}. For all µ ∈ ∂ν∗∗ (0) and all
A ∈ Σ we have µ (A) ≥ ν (A); moreover, −µ (Ω) = µ (−1Ω) ≥ ν∗∗ (−1Ω) = −ν (Ω), whence
µ (Ω) = ν (Ω) and µ ∈ core (ν). Therefore, ∂ν∗∗ (0) ⊆ core (ν) and for all g ∈ B1 (Σ)
ν∗ (g) = min
µ∈∂ν∗∗(0)
µ (g) ≥ min
µ∈core(ν)
µ (g) = νe (g) ≥ ν∗ (g) .
The last inequality follows from Lemma 24. This proves that νe = ν∗ is na-continuous on
B1 (Σ) and that ν is exact.
(iii) implies (iv). Exactness guarantees that νe|B1(Σ) is a concave extension of ν to B1 (Σ).
Then na-continuity of νe|B1(Σ) = ν
∗, together with Theorem 6, guarantees that core (ν) is a
norm compact subset of na (Σ). Continuity and non-atomicity of ν follow from Proposition
1.
(iv) ⇒ (v). Continuity and non-atomicity of ν, together with Proposition 1, guarantee
core (ν) ⊆ naν(Ω) (Σ). Just set K = core (ν).
(v) ⇒ (i) and the first part of (10). Assume ν is the lower envelope of a norm relatively
compact subset K of naα (Σ). Obviously, co (K) ⊆ co∗ (K) ⊆ core (ν). Proposition 1 guar-
antees that ν is continuous and non-atomic, a second application of Proposition 1, yields that
core (ν) ⊆ na (Σ). Since
min
µ∈core(ν)
µ (A) = ν (A) = νK (A) = inf
φ∈K
φ (A) , ∀A ∈ Σ,
Corollary 30 implies core (ν) ⊆ co (K). This delivers the first part of (10). Since core (ν) ⊆
na (Σ), there exists a non-atomic probability measure λ ∈ na (Σ) such that core (ν) ⊆
ca (Σ, λ) (see [10, Thm. IV.9.2]), while the Mazur Compactness Theorem implies that of
core (ν) is norm compact. Lemma 26 guarantees that the functional
νee : L∞ (λ) → R
f 7→ minµ∈core(ν) µ (f)
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is continuous in the relative weak* topology of BL∞(λ), a fortiori νe is σ (B1 (Σ) , ca (Σ, λ))-
continuous and na-continuous. We conclude that νe is the required na-continuous and su-
perlinear extension.
In sum, (i)-(v) are equivalent and the first part of (10) holds.
Next we show the equivalence between (i) and (vi) and that the second part of (10) holds.
(i) ⇒ (vi). Since core (ν) is a norm compact subset of na (Σ), for all ε > 0, there is a
finite subsetM of core (ν) such that for all µ ∈ core (ν) there exists φ ∈M with ‖µ− φ‖ < ε.
Consider the exact linear production game νM . Clearly, νM ≥ ν. Let A be any coalition and
µ ∈ core (ν) such that µ (A) = ν (A). If φ ∈M satisfies ‖µ− φ‖ < ε, we have
0 ≤ νM (A)− ν (A) ≤ φ (A)− µ (A) ≤ ‖φ− µ‖ < ε.
So that supA∈Σ |νM (A)− ν (A)| ≤ ε, which implies that ν belongs to the supnorm closure of
the set of exact linear production games.
(vi) ⇒ (i) and the second part of (10). Let νn be a sequence of exact linear production
games uniformly converging to ν. Notice that ν∗n is a na-continuous and bounded function
on B1 (Σ) for all n ∈ N. Next we show that ν∗n is a Cauchy sequence (in the space Cb (B1 (Σ))
of all bounded and na-continuous functions on B1 (Σ) endowed with the supnorm). For all
ε > 0 there exists p ∈ N such that for all m,n ≥ p
sup
A∈Σ
|νm (A)− νn (A)| ≤ ε,
but, the function |ν∗m − ν∗n| : B1 (Σ) → R is na-continuous and the characteristic functions
are na-dense in B1 (Σ), therefore
sup
f∈B1(Σ)
|ν∗m (f)− ν∗n (f)| ≤ ε.
Let ν∗ be the limit of ν∗n in Cb (B1 (Σ)) with the supnorm. Checking that ν is superadditive,
ν∗ is an extension of ν to B1 (Σ) (obviously na-continuous), and that ν∗ satisfies condition
(9) of (ii) is an easy exercise. Hence ν is an exact market game.
Now, notice that, by (iii) we have that ν∗ = νe|B1(Σ) and ν
∗
n = (νn)e|B1(Σ). The uniform










Let λ0 ∈ na (Σ) be a probability measure such that core (ν) ⊆ ca (Σ, λ0) and λn ∈ na (Σ)






























































∣∣∣∣ minµn∈core(νn)µn (2f)− minµ∈core(ν)µ (2f)







∣∣∣∣ minµn∈core(νn)µn (f)− minµ∈core(ν)µ (f)
∣∣∣∣+ |ν (Ω)− νn (Ω)|
)
= 0.
This concludes the proof since the Hausdorff distance between core (νn) and core (ν) in
ca (Σ, λ) (and hence in ba (Σ)) is given by (see, e.g., [1, Ch. 6.7]):
dH (core (νn) , core (ν)) = sup
g∈BL∞(λ)
∣∣σcore(νn) (g)− σcore(ν) (g)∣∣
= sup
g∈BL∞(λ)
∣∣∣∣ minµn∈core(νn)µn (g)− minµ∈core(ν)µ (g)
∣∣∣∣ .

Proposition 15. (i) ⇒ (ii). If C is a norm compact (resp. finite dimensional) subset of
na (Σ), then (see the proof of Theorem 9) VC is na-continuous on BB(Σ) (resp. B (Σ)), and
(ii) follows.
(ii) ⇒ (i). For all r ∈ R, {VC ≤ r}∩BB(Σ) (resp. {VC ≤ r}) and {VC ≥ r}∩BB(Σ) (resp.
{VC ≥ r}) are na-closed. Therefore, VC is a superlinear and na-continuous extension of νC
to BB(Σ) (resp. B (Σ)). The technique used at the end of the proof of Theorem 9 delivers
(i). 
Corollary 16. (i) ⇒ (ii). For all f ∈ B (Σ), f ∼i VCi (f) 1Ω for i = 1, 2, hence
VC2 (f) 1Ω ∼2 f %2 VC1 (f) 1Ω and VC2 (f) ≥ VC1 (f) ,
in particular νC1 ≤ νC2 .
(ii) ⇒ (i). By Corollary 30, C2 ⊆ co (C1). Therefore, VC2 ≥ Vco(C1) = VC1 , and (i)
immediately follows. 
Corollaries 17, 18, and 19 are just restatements of Proposition 10, Corollary 8, and 11.
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